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ABORTION RIGHTS UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY
Robert L. Bentlyewski*
The U.S. Supreme Court appears poised to overturn Roe v. Wade and its
progeny, removing any federal law protection of the right to an abortion.
However, numerous state supreme courts have interpreted their state
constitutions to independently recognize such a right, finding their state’s
equal protection, due process, and privacy rights more expansive than those
at the federal level. This Essay surveys all fifty states to ascertain how much
protection each state currently affords to women’s right to an abortion. Most
state supreme courts have not made a determinative ruling on the issue, and
a significant majority of state constitutions do not contain a provision
explicitly protecting or denying the right, so state courts are likely to be the
venues for many of the contentious fights over abortion rights in the years to
come.
INTRODUCTION
On May 2, 2022, Politico leaked a draft of Justice Samuel Alito’s
forthcoming majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization.1 The draft indicated that the U.S. Supreme Court is poised to
overrule the 1973 landmark case Roe v. Wade,2 which established that
women have a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution to receive an
abortion prior to the viability of a fetus,3 and the 1992 case Planned

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; M.P.A., 2019, The City College

of New York; B.A., 2014, Brown University. Thank you to the Honorable Jack M. Sabatino
for the crash course on state constitutional law. Thanks to my Fordham Law Review
teammates whose editing made this Essay possible on a short timeline: Leigh Forsyth, Isaac
Krier, Edward McLaughlin, Tiffany Monroy, Rebecca Spendley, Eric Szkarlat, and Kaleb
Underwood. Thanks most of all to my wife, Em.
1. See Josh Gerstein & Alexander Ward, Supreme Court Has Voted to Overturn Abortion
Rights, Draft Opinion Shows, POLITICO (May 2, 2022, 8:32 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473
[https://perma.cc/3J28-GVJ6].
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See id. at 153 (“[The] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”).
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Parenthood v. Casey,4 which confirmed the right’s existence but reduced its
constitutional protection.5
If Justice Alito’s draft opinion in Dobbs becomes the law of the land,
roughly half of state governments can be expected to attempt to ban or
heavily restrict women’s ability to receive an abortion.6 Together, the
Supreme Court opinion and the state regulations it makes possible will mark
a tectonic shift in U.S. law—both for massively restraining women’s bodily
autonomy and for threatening other rights based in substantive due process.7
Justice Alito wrote, “[i]t is time to heed the Constitution and return the
issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.”8 However, there
are fifty other constitutions in this country that also must be heeded and will
be totally unaffected by the Dobbs ruling: the state constitutions.9 If a state’s
high court found that the state’s constitution protects a right to abortion equal
to or greater than the extent articulated in Roe and Casey, that state’s elected
representatives will have no greater power to regulate the reproductive health
of pregnant people than they had before Dobbs.10 If state constitutions
independently and adequately provide a right, it is irrelevant whether a
parallel federal right exists when state courts consider the constitutionality of
a law or state action.11 The Supreme Court has no authority to overrule a
state’s supreme court interpreting its own state constitution or statutes, as
long as the federal government’s powers are not implicated.12 For the
4. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5. See id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s
ability to make this decision [to receive an abortion] does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
6. See Allison McCann & Taylor Johnston, Where Abortion Could Be Banned Without
Roe
v.
Wade,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
3,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/us/abortion-bans-restrictons-roe-v-wade.html
[https://perma.cc/XJJ9-QXA7].
7. See Andrew Chung, Gay Marriage, Other Rights at Risk After U.S. Supreme Court
Abortion Move, REUTERS, May 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/gay-marriageother-rights-risk-after-us-supreme-court-abortion-move-2022-05-04/.
[https://perma.cc/5THY-NGFJ]. Substantive due process “forbids the government from
infringing upon certain fundamental liberty interests, no matter what process is afforded unless
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 16C CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM, Constitutional Law § 1821 (footnotes omitted).
8. Gerstein & Ward, supra note 1 (quoting the eighth page of the draft opinion).
9. See Mark J. Stern, A Post-Roe Road Map, SLATE (July 9, 2018, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/in-planned-parenthood-v-reynolds-the-iowasupreme-court-gives-states-a-post-roe-road-map.html [https://perma.cc/7G8Q-WP43].
10. See id.
11. See generally Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053 (1999). See also, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (“Regardless of what may be required under the federal
standard, however, our view is that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case implicates the
double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
12. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (1 Wall.) 590, 638 (1874) (holding that
“[w]hether decided well or otherwise by the State court, [the U.S. Supreme Court has] no
authority to inquire” when a state court decision rests on state grounds). However, if Congress
passes nationwide abortion regulations, federal powers would be implicated and state
constitutional protections would pose no obstacle to enforcement. See Deepa Shivram, White
House: Serious Risk of Nationwide Abortion Ban After McConnell Floats the Idea, NAT’L
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people’s elected representatives to enforce any laws restricting women’s
bodily autonomy, those laws must be able to survive state constitutional
scrutiny. For this reason, the focus of the legal fight over the right to an
abortion is likely to shift to state court venues like never before.13
This Essay surveys all fifty states for whether each state’s highest court
has determined that a state constitutional right to an abortion exists, and if
so, why. The purpose of this Essay is to serve as a springboard for those
turning their attention to state constitutions for the first time, both to illustrate
the general landscape of state-level abortion rights and to point to leading
cases and constitutional provisions for each state. It is intended to be a
starting point—not an end point—and does not analyze any one state’s
constitutional protection of abortion or lack thereof at complete depth. Of
the fifteen state supreme courts that have ruled on whether their respective
states’ constitutions contain a right to an abortion, all but one have found
such a right exists.14 Those states are discussed in Part I. Part II.A looks at
the six states whose constitutions explicitly lack an abortion right, or whose
state supreme courts have ruled that no implicit right exists. Part II.B
discusses the remaining states, broken down by geographic region, that have
yet to rule conclusively either way and can be expected to become legal
battlegrounds in the coming years.
I. STATES WITH CONFIRMED RIGHTS TO ABORTION
The thirteen states whose supreme courts have confirmed that women
currently have a right to an abortion under their state constitutions are Alaska,
California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi (to
a lesser extent), Montana, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and
Washington. The impending Dobbs decision will not alter the legal
protection of abortions in these states, barring overrulings and constitutional
amendments.
A. Alaska
In the 1997 case Valley Hospital Association, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for
Choice,15 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 22 of the

PUB. RADIO (May 9, 2022, 7:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/2022/05/09/1097614463/whitehouse-responds-to-protests-over-leaked-supreme-court-draft-opinion-on-roe
[https://perma.cc/VP72-L69H] (discussing the implications of a potential nationwide abortion
ban, with both President Joseph Biden and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell agreeing
that such legislation is possible to pass and would be enforceable).
13. See Stern, supra note 9.
14. See infra Part I. The one state supreme court that failed to find a right to an abortion
was North Dakota’s, which did so with a court that was split 2-2-1. See infra Part II (discussing
MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 855 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 2014)). The Tennessee Supreme Court
found that its constitution contained an abortion right, but a subsequent amendment preempted
the ruling. See id. (discussing Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d
1 (Tenn. 2000)).
15. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
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Alaska Constitution16 as protecting a fundamental right to abortions in a
manner equal to Roe v. Wade and declined to adopt the lessened protections
of Casey.17 Article I, Section 22 is an explicit privacy provision that reads
in relevant part: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed.”18 The court found that the right to privacy is
“fundamental,” and “few things are more personal than a woman’s control of
her body, including the choice of whether and when to have children,” so
“reproductive rights are fundamental.”19 The court held that the strict
scrutiny test the U.S. Supreme Court called for in Roe would be the law of
the land in Alaska: “These rights may be legally constrained only when the
constraints are justified by a compelling state interest, and no less restrictive
means could advance that interest. These fundamental reproductive rights
include the right to an abortion.”20
B. California
Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution reads: “All people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, . . . and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.”21 In the pre-Roe 1969 case People v.
Belous,22 the California Supreme Court found that this provision recognized
and protected a “fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children[.]”23 The court found that California’s 1850 abortion laws were
constitutional at the time they were passed because abortions were so much
more dangerous then: “[I]n the light of the then existing medical and surgical
science, the great and direct interference with a woman’s constitutional rights
was warranted by considerations of the woman’s health.”24 But once
medicine advanced and abortions became safe procedures, outlawing
abortions made women much less safe because it drove them to seek
dangerous, unprofessional abortions, and such illegal abortions were “the
most common single cause of maternal deaths in California” at the time.25
Thus, the California Constitution permitted outlawing abortion under the
circumstances of the nineteenth century, but not the twentieth century.

16. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
17. See Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 948 P.2d at 969 (“The scope of the fundamental right to
an abortion that we conclude is encompassed within article I, section 22, is similar to that
expressed in Roe v. Wade. We do not, however, adopt as Alaska constitutional law the
narrower definition of that right promulgated in the plurality opinion in Casey.”).
18. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
19. Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 948 P.2d at 968–69 (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159,
169 (Alaska 1972)).
20. Id. at 969.
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
22. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
23. Id. at 199.
24. Id. at 200.
25. Id. at 200–01 (adding, “[i]t is now safer for a woman to have a hospital therapeutic
abortion during the first trimester than to bear a child”).
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The court revisited the issue in the 1997 case American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren,26 which involved a minor’s right to receive an
abortion without parental consent. The court affirmed that “the interest in
autonomy privacy protected by the California constitutional privacy clause
includes a pregnant woman’s right to choose whether or not to continue her
pregnancy.”27 The court continued:
[T]he right to choose whether to continue or to terminate a pregnancy
implicates a woman’s fundamental interest in the preservation of her
personal health (and in some instances the preservation of her life), her
interest in retaining personal control over the integrity of her own body,
and her interest in deciding for herself whether to parent a child.28

Since the right is fundamental, the court required that restrictions meet
Roe’s “compelling interest” standard,29 which is higher than Casey’s “undue
burden” standard.30
C. Florida
The Florida Supreme Court struck down a law that created a twenty-fourhour waiting period before a woman could receive an abortion in the 2017
case Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State.31 Article I, Section 23 of the
Florida Constitution states that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life[.]”32
The court found that the privacy clause “encompasses a woman’s right to
choose to end her pregnancy. This right would have little substance if it did
not also include the woman’s right to effectuate her decision to end her
pregnancy.”33 Since that right is fundamental, the court found that “the
burden falls on the State to prove both the existence of a compelling state
interest and that the law serves that compelling state interest through the least
restrictive means,”34 which is again higher than the Casey undue burden
standard.
This was not the first Florida Supreme Court case to find a right to an
abortion under the privacy clause. The first instance came in the 1989 case
In re T.W.,35 in which the court stated: “We can conceive of few more
personal or private decisions concerning one’s body that one can make in the
course of a lifetime [than an abortion], except perhaps the decision of the
26. 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
27. Id. at 813.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 819.
30. See also Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rts. v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981)
(finding that the state must fund abortion care for indigent persons at the same level as other
care because “when the state finances the cost of childbirth, but will not finance the
termination of pregnancy, it realistically forces an indigent pregnant woman to choose
childbirth even though she has the constitutional right to refuse to do so”).
31. 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017).
32. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
33. Gainesville Woman Care, 210 So. 3d at 1254.
34. Id. at 1256.
35. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
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terminally ill in their choice of whether to discontinue necessary medical
treatment.”36
D. Iowa
“Heartbeat bans” prohibit abortions once a fetal heartbeat is detectable on
an ultrasound.37 The Iowa Supreme Court found one such heartbeat ban
unconstitutional in the 2018 case Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v.
Reynolds.38 Unlike the three cases above, the Iowa Supreme Court did not
strike down the law as a violation of Iowa women’s privacy rights, but rather
as a violation of the state constitution’s equal protection clause.39 In doing
so, the court explicitly adopted Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg’s argument for
why the right to an abortion is a fundamental right and applied it to the Iowa
Constitution40
The court provided the following justification for viewing abortion as an
equal protection issue:
Autonomy is the great equalizer. Laws that diminish women’s control over
their reproductive futures can have profound consequences for women . . . .
Without the opportunity to control their reproductive lives, women may
need to place their educations on hold, pause or abandon their careers, and
never fully assume a position in society equal to men, who face no such
similar constraints for comparable sexual activity. Societal advancements
in occupational opportunities are meaningless if women cannot access
them . . . . Equality and liberty in this instance, as in so many others, are
irretrievably connected.41

The Iowa Supreme Court concluded by also adopting the Roe-level
standard for evaluating restrictions on abortion, requiring the state “to
demonstrate the action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest,”42 rather than the lower Casey standard.
E. Kansas
The Kansas Constitution begins with a sentence partially borrowed from
the Declaration of Independence: “All men are possessed of equal and
inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
36. Id. at 1192.
37. See B. Jessie Hill, The Geography of Abortion Rights, 109 GEO. L.J. 1081, 1124 n.239
(2021).
38. 915 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 2018).
39. See id. at 245–46 (citing IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6 (“All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of
citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens.”)).
40. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 915 N.W.2d at 245 (“[I]n the balance is a
woman’s autonomous charge of her life’s full course . . . , her ability to stand in relation to
man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.” (quoting Ruth B.
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 383 (1985))).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 245–46.
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happiness.”43 In the 2019 case Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt,44 the
Kansas Supreme Court found that those words constitute “more than an
idealized aspiration,” laying the foundation for substantive rights.45 Those
substantive rights “include a woman’s right to make decisions about her
body, including the decision whether to continue her pregnancy[.]”46
The Kansas court applied an originalist rationale, stating, “the state’s
founders acknowledged that the people had rights that preexisted the
formation of the Kansas government . . . . Included in that limited category
is the right of personal autonomy, which includes the ability to control one’s
own body, to assert bodily integrity, and to exercise self-determination.”47
The court pointed out that this is not a due process right—being substantive
in character rather than procedural—which “remove[d] from [the court’s]
calculus one of the criticisms of Roe and other decisions of the United States
Supreme Court relying on substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”48 Rather, the court found it to be a fundamental
liberty interest that predates the state constitution and “allows a woman to
make her own decisions regarding her body, health, family formation, and
family life—decisions that can include whether to continue a pregnancy.”49
Accordingly, the court adopted the Roe standard in finding regulation of
abortion unconstitutional “unless it is [done] to further a compelling
government interest and in a way that is narrowly tailored to that interest.”50
F. Massachusetts
In the 1981 case Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance,51 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found a right to an abortion implicit
in the state constitution’s due process clause.52 The court looked to a series
of cases involving private marriage and parenting matters in which the state
could not meddle, and it determined that the cases recognized “the existence
of a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”53 The court
added that this recognition “is a cardinal precept of [the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court’s] jurisprudence.”54 The court found “a woman’s
right to make the abortion decision privately” to be “but one aspect of a far
broader constitutional guarantee of privacy.”55

43. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rts., § 1.
44. 440 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2019).
45. Id. at 466.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id. at 466.
50. Id.
51. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
52. See id. at 399; see also MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. X.
53. Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 398–99 (quoting Custody of Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Mass.
1979) and collecting cases).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 398.
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Although the language of Massachusetts and federal due process clauses
do not differ in any substantive way,56 the Moe court found the Massachusetts
Constitution more protective than the U.S. Supreme Court found the U.S.
Constitution to be in the similar case of Harris v. McRae.57 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that since the right to an
abortion is an aspect of the “fundamental right of privacy,” restrictions of it
must pass a high level of scrutiny.58 However, as Massachusetts had
developed its own idiosyncratic balancing test for encroachments upon
fundamental rights, it did not directly apply the Roe compelling interest
test.59 The court balanced “the State interest . . . in the preservation of life,
albeit potential life” against the interest of a pregnant woman in choosing to
get an abortion and found the balance “to be decisively in favor of the
individual right [of the woman] involved.”60
G. Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a law limiting state funding
for abortions as violative of women’s right to privacy in the 1995 case Doe
v. Gomez.61 The court found a right to privacy preserved in the penumbra of
Sections 2, 7, and 10 of Article I of the Minnesota Constitution.62 The court
analogized the right to an abortion to the right “to be free from intrusive
medical treatment”63 and stated, “[the] right [of privacy] begins with
protecting the integrity of one’s own body and includes the right not to have
it altered or invaded without consent.”64 The court then likened the case to
the forced-sterilization case Skinner v. Oklahoma,65 writing: “The right of
procreation without state interference has long been recognized as ‘one of the
basic civil rights of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race.’”66
The court “conclude[d] that the right of privacy under the Minnesota
Constitution encompasses a woman’s right to decide to terminate her
pregnancy” because the court could “think of few decisions more intimate,
56. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 103
(Mass. 1997) (summarizing Moe).
57. See Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 400 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (involving
the state funding of abortions under Medicaid)).
58. Id. at 400–01.
59. See id. at 403 (“[The compelling interest test], if accepted, would prove fatal to the
challenged restriction. Rather than mechanically accepting this result, however, we prefer to
test these enactments by the balancing principles which we have developed in our own recent
decisions.”).
60. Id. at 404. Note that this case specifically involved “medically necessary” abortions.
See id. at 391.
61. 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995).
62. See id. at 19 (citing MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (ensuring due process), 7 (same), and
10 (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures)).
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148
(Minn. 1988)).
65. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
66. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
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personal, and profound than a woman’s decision between childbirth and
abortion.”67 Any state restriction of this fundamental right must survive strict
scrutiny under the Roe compelling state interest standard.68 The court also
noted that there may be a separate equal protection foundation for the right
to an abortion, but it analyzed this case purely as a matter of privacy.69
H. Mississippi
In the 1998 case Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice,70 the Mississippi
Supreme Court found that women have a right to receive an abortion under
the privacy protections inherent in Article III, Section 32 of the Mississippi
Constitution,71 the state’s analog to the U.S. Constitution’s Ninth
Amendment.72 The court found that within that privacy right is the right to
bodily integrity, and “[p]rotected within the right of autonomous bodily
integrity is an implicit right to have an abortion.”73 Although the court—like
all the supreme courts above—usually applies strict scrutiny to state
restrictions of such privacy rights, it found that “[t]he abortion issue is much
more complex than most cases involving privacy rights” and placed the court
“in the precarious position of both protecting a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy before viability and protecting unborn life.”74 The court broke
from its previous privacy jurisprudence by adopting the Casey undue burden
standard rather than the Roe compelling interest standard, although it
emphasized that future privacy rights in other matters are not excluded from
strict scrutiny protection.75 There is only one abortion clinic open in
Mississippi today,76 emblematic of the possible state of affairs under this
reduced but non-zero level of constitutional protection.
I. Montana
The Montana Supreme Court performed an originalist analysis of its state
constitution in the 1999 case Armstrong v. State77 and found that a
fundamental right to an abortion was very firmly situated within “Montana’s
historical commitment to the right of privacy and . . . core right to be let
alone[.]”78 In what reads like a direct rebuke to Justice Alito’s leaked
67. Id.
68. See id. at 31.
69. See id. at 19.
70. 716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998).
71. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32 (“The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be
construed to deny and impair others retained by, and inherent in, the people.”).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
73. Pro-Choice Miss., 716 So. 2d at 653.
74. Id. at 655.
75. See id.
76. See Rick Rojas, Inside the Last Abortion Clinic in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/us/mississippi-abortion-clinic-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/2SST-HVVW].
77. 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
78. Id. at 377.
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statement that abortion must be returned to the “people’s elected
representatives,”79 the Montana Supreme Court cautioned: “Unless
fundamental constitutional rights—procreative autonomy being the present
example—are grounded in something more substantial than the prevailing
political winds, Huxley’s Brave New World or Orwell’s 1984 will always be
as close as the next election.”80
The court rattled off various independent sources of this right within the
Montana Constitution. Article II, Section 3 provides broad protection for
unenumerated “inalienable rights,”81 guarantees “the right to seek and obtain
medical care from a chosen health care provider and to make personal
judgments affecting one’s own health and bodily integrity without
government interference.”82 Montana’s equal protection clause83 also
preserves that right because it “requires that people have an equal right to
form and to follow their own values in profoundly spiritual matters.”84 The
state’s establishment85 and free exercise86 clauses protect “the freedom to
accept or reject any religious doctrine, including those about abortion, and
the right to express one’s opinion in all lawful ways and forums.”87 The
privacy clause88 “requires the government to leave us alone in all these most
personal and private matters.”89 Finally, the due process clause90 “protects
those rights—including rights of personal and procreative autonomy—
inherent in the historical concept of ‘ordered liberty.’”91 Not surprisingly,
the court adopted the Roe compelling interest standard to require strict
scrutiny of state limitations on the right to choose.92
J. New Jersey
In the 1982 case Right to Choose v. Byrne,93 the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that women had a fundamental right to an abortion under the
state’s equal protection clause,94 in a case involving state funding of
abortions necessary to save mothers’ lives.95 The court found that the right

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Gerstein & Ward, supra note 1 (quoting the eighth page of the draft opinion).
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 378.
MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 4.
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 5.
Id. § 7.
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 10.
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 17.
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
See id. at 384.
450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 1.
See Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 941.
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to privacy is implicit in the equal protection clause and had been since the
1844 iteration of the state’s constitution.96
The later case Greenberg v. Kimmelman97 clarified the level of scrutiny
New Jersey courts use in evaluating infringements upon such rights in equal
protection challenges, which is different from the federal approach:
“[W]e . . . consider[] the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the
governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the
restriction.”98 The outcome of the test is usually the same as a traditional
strict scrutiny, compelling state interest analysis.99 In the 2000 case Planned
Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer,100 the court indicated its
agreement with a 1967 dissent from its former Chief Justice Joseph
Weintraub,101 which contained the assertion: “[K]nowing nothing about the
void before or after their earthly presence, . . . men cannot agree upon the
stage at which an embryo or fetus has a claim to acquire life in human form
strong enough to override a woman’s right to her own bodily integrity.”102
K. New York
In the 1994 case of Hope v. Perales,103 New York’s highest court, the New
York Court of Appeals, plainly announced that “the fundamental right of
reproductive choice, inherent in the due process liberty right guaranteed by
our State Constitution, is at least as extensive as the Federal constitutional
right” under Roe and Casey.104 As the defendant in the case, the state
government did not dispute that interpretation.105 The court found that while
the facts of the case did not implicate that fundamental right under the state’s
due process clause,106 under New York law, state regulations limiting
fundamental rights must “promote a compelling State interest and [be]
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose,”107 as in Roe.

96. See id. at 933. Note that New Jersey’s equal protection clause is broader than its
federal analog, also including a protection of “natural and unalienable rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 1.
97. 494 A.2d 294 (N.J. 1985).
98. Id. at 302.
99. See id. at 303.
100. 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000).
101. See id. at 629 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967) (Weintraub,
C.J., dissenting in part)).
102. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 709 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
103. 634 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1994).
104. Id. at 186.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 188; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
107. Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611, 614 (N.Y. 1990) (discussing fundamental equal
protection rights).
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L. Vermont
There is some disagreement about whether the pre-Roe 1972 Vermont
Supreme Court case Beecham v. Leahy108 established the presence of a state
constitutional right to an abortion.109 Future U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy and
James Jeffords represented the state government and argued for the
constitutionality of a statute that punished doctors who performed
abortions.110 The court admonished the legislature for its “hypocrisy.”111 It
reasoned that the legislature punished doctors but not mothers because of an
“implicit recognition” of women’s right to an abortion.112 By recognizing
the right to an abortion but blocking doctors from performing them, the
legislature indirectly prohibited women from exercising a guaranteed right
that it knew it could not restrict outright.113
The court called abortion “an appropriate area for legislative action,
provided such legislation does not . . . restrict to the point of unlawful
prohibition.”114 The court, however, did not identify the “point of unlawful
prohibition” or the standard it would use to recognize that cutoff. With the
citizens of Vermont voting on an amendment in November of 2022 that
would put Roe’s compelling interest language explicitly into the Vermont
Constitution,115 debate over Beecham may soon become moot.
M. Washington
In the 1975 case State v. Koome,116 the Washington State Supreme Court
found that the Article I, Section 3 due process clause of the Washington
Constitution recognized a privacy right analogous to the one the Roe Court
found under the Fourteenth Amendment.117 The case involved a statute that
required minors to obtain parental consent before receiving an abortion—a
108. 287 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1972).
109. See Cheryl Hanna, Beechman v. Leahy and the Doctrine of Hypocrisy, 32 VT. L. REV.
673, 679 (2008) (“I have sometimes heard folks suggest that Beecham holds that in Vermont
there is a state constitutional right to abortion. Such an interpretation of Beecham is clearly
wrong.”).
110. Senator Leahy later said that he never prosecuted a doctor under the statute as a state
prosecutor, and he told the Supreme Court candidly that he felt it was unconstitutional. See
Anne Galloway, Senators Aim to Remove Vermont’s Abortion Provider Law from the Books,
BRATTLEBORO REFORMER (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.reformer.com/local-news/senatorsaim-to-remove-vermonts-abortion-provider-law-from-the-books/article_6757752d-8b8a56b4-84a6-fab1b7123b54.html [https://perma.cc/L5FB-RQ7G]. He claimed he did the
minimum required of his office in representing the state government. See id.
111. Beecham, 287 A.2d at 839.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 839–40.
114. Id. at 840.
115. Declaration of Rights; Right to Personal Reproductive Liberty, Prop. 5, 2021–2022
Sess. (Vt. 2022). The amendment, if approved, will read: “That an individual’s right to
personal reproductive autonomy is central to the liberty and dignity to determine one’s own
life course and shall not be denied or infringed unless justified by a compelling State interest
achieved by the least restrictive means.” Id.
116. 530 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
117. See id. at 263 (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
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requirement the court also found to be an equal protection violation under
Article I, Section 12 of the Washington Constitution.118 The court found
three classifications in the statute that violated equal protection guarantees:
“(1) between unmarried adult women seeking abortions and similarly
situated minors; (2) between married and unmarried minors; and (3) between
unmarried minors seeking abortions, and others seeking other types of
medical care.”119 Laws restricting either the due process or equal protection
rights found in this case must serve a compelling state interest to be
constitutional, as in Roe.120
II. STATES DENYING OR SILENT ON THE RIGHT TO ABORTION
In a majority of states, state supreme courts have not authoritatively
determined that the right to an abortion is cognizable under the respective
states’ constitutions. Part II.A discusses the states that have outright rejected
the existence of that right. Part II.B analyzes the status of the law in the states
whose courts have not yet made a conclusive determination on the issue
either way.
A. Explicit Rejection
Six states have ratified constitutional provisions which explicitly state that
no right to an abortion exists under their constitutions: Alabama,121
Arkansas,122 Louisiana,123 Rhode Island,124 Tennessee,125 and West
Virginia.126 Tennessee amended its constitution to remove the right to an
abortion after the Tennessee Supreme Court found that a fundamental right
to an abortion existed within a constellation of seven separate provisions of
the Tennessee Constitution127 and, as in Roe, it required a compelling state

118. See id. at 266–67 (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12).
119. Id. at 266.
120. See id. at 264.
121. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.06(c) (“Nothing in this constitution secures or protects a right
to abortion or requires the funding of an abortion.”).
122. ARK. CONST. amend. LXVIII, § 2 (“The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of
every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal
Constitution.”).
123. LA. CONST. art. I, § 20.1 (“To protect human life, nothing in this constitution shall be
construed to secure or protect a right to abortion or require the funding of abortion.”).
124. The Rhode Island Constitution’s relevant provision, however, only applies to the
state’s equal protection rights. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof.”). This does
not preclude the possibility that a right to an abortion could be found elsewhere in the state
constitution.
125. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 36 (“Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to
abortion or requires the funding of an abortion.”).
126. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 57 (“Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right
to abortion or requires the funding of abortion.”).
127. See Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000)
(finding a relevant privacy right emerging from “from the express grants of rights in Article I,
sections 3, 7, 19, and 27, and also from the grants of liberty in Article I, sections 1, 2, and 8”).
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interest to overcome that right.128 Similarly, West Virginia amended its
constitution to ensure no right to an abortion could be found after its supreme
court implied such a right exists.129
Only one state supreme court has definitively ruled that a right to an
abortion does not exist under its due process and other state constitutional
protections: North Dakota. In North Dakota, at least four of its five supreme
court justices must sign onto a majority opinion in order to find a statute
unconstitutional under the North Dakota Constitution.130
In MKB
Management v. Burdick,131 two justices found that an independent state
constitutional right to an abortion existed, two did not, and one only opined
on the constitutionality of the statute in question under federal law.132 The
justices who found that no right existed utilized an originalist approach.133
Despite acknowledging that the North Dakota Constitution provides
protections “more expansive than the due process language in the federal
constitution,”134 the justices could “discern no basis for concluding the North
Dakota Constitution imposes greater restrictions upon the State than the
federal constitution.”135
B. Silent
The remaining states have no clear statement in their state constitutions as
to whether a right to an abortion exists, and their state supreme courts have
not provided an authoritative answer to that question. Some state courts have
avoided the issue by following an interstitial approach to constitutional
analysis—analyzing cases under the U.S. Constitution first, and if the court
finds no federal constitutional cause to strike down a statute, only then would
the court look to the state constitution for greater protections.136 This
contrasts with the primacy approach, under which courts analyze cases as
state constitutional matters first and federal matters second.137 This section
will discuss the present status of the remaining states by region.
128. See id. at 15.
129. See Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 667 (W. Va.
1993) (finding an abortion funding restriction unconstitutional under the federal standard and
suggesting “West Virginia’s enhanced constitutional protections” would be even more
protective than the federally-protected right).
130. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
131. 855 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 2014).
132. See id. at 31–32.
133. See id. at 45 (“Our state constitution is silent about creating a state constitutional right
to abortion, and the prevailing practice in the Dakota Territory and when the relevant
constitutional provisions were adopted prohibited abortions except to preserve a woman’s
life.”).
134. Id. at 35.
135. Id. at 45.
136. See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997) (“Under the interstitial approach, the
court asks first whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution. If
it is, then the state constitutional claim is not reached. If it is not, then the state constitution is
examined.”).
137. See State v. Fleming, 239 A.3d 648, 654 n.9 (Me. 2020) (“Under the primacy approach
applied by this Court, we first look to the Maine Constitution, with federal precedent serving
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i. Midwest
Illinois: In Hope Clinic for Women v. Flores,138 the Illinois Supreme Court
performed an originalist analysis and found “no state grounds for deviating
from the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation that the federal due
process clause protects a woman’s right to an abortion.”139 The court found
it significant that the following language was removed from an early draft of
the Illinois Constitution: “No penalty may be imposed by law upon any
person in connection with an abortion performed by a licensed physician with
the consent of the woman upon whom it is performed . . . .”140 However, the
court also noted that delegates to the Illinois Constitutional Convention
considered and rejected anti-abortion language as well, which would have
included the words “including the unborn” in the due process clause.141 Now
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause142
appears poised to change, it remains to be seen whether the Illinois Supreme
Court will adapt its interpretation to remain in lockstep with the U.S.
Supreme Court or maintains its interpretation as mirroring Roe and Casey.
Indiana: Like in Illinois, the Indiana courts have been mirroring the
federal courts in their abortion jurisprudence. In Clinic for Women, Inc. v.
Brizzi,143 the Indiana Supreme Court stated that its “material burden test” is
“the equivalent of Casey’s undue burden test, at least for purposes of
assessing whether a state regulation violates any fundamental right of privacy
that may include protection of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
that might exist under Article I, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution.”144
Michigan: The Michigan Court of Appeals, the state’s intermediate
appellate court, stated emphatically that no right to an abortion exists under
the Michigan Constitution in Mahaffey v. Attorney General.145 The court
stated that “[i]t is the public policy of the state to proscribe abortion”146 and
that “there is no right to abortion under the Michigan Constitution.”147
Article III, Section 8 of the Michigan Constitution148 permits the Governor
to seek advisory opinions from the Michigan Supreme Court, and Governor
Gretchen Whitmer is exercising that power to get from the court a final word
as potentially persuasive but not dispositive guidance with respect to constitutional provisions
with similar goals.” (citation omitted)). Some state courts practice discretion in deciding on
which constitution to begin its analysis. See, e.g., State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Iowa
2011) (“When, as here, a defendant raises both federal and state constitutional claims, the
court has discretion to consider either claim first or consider the claims simultaneously.”).
138. 991 N.E.2d 745 (Ill. 2013).
139. Id. at 760.
140. Id. at 759 n.5.
141. Id. at 758–59.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. 837 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 2005).
144. Id. at 984.
145. 564 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, 616 N.W.2d 168 (Mich.
1998).
146. Id. at 110 (quoting People v. Bricker, 208 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Mich. 1973)).
147. Id.
148. MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 8.
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on abortion rights under the state constitution.149 The Michigan Supreme
Court is likely to break its silence on abortion in response to the governor’s
request.
Missouri: In Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood the St.
Louis Region v. Nixon,150 the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Casey
decision in interpreting the Missouri Constitution’s due process and equal
protection provisions.151 The court found “no reason . . . to construe this
language from the Missouri [C]onstitution more broadly than the language
used in the United States [C]onstitution.”152 The court will likely soon need
to decide whether to reduce its protection of this right in lockstep with the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Nebraska: The Nebraska Supreme Court has not determined whether the
right to an abortion exists in its state constitution. However, since the Casey
decision, the court has suggested that there may be a state basis for such a
right. The court stated in Robotham v. State153 that the “constitutional right
to privacy” includes matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.154 Although “[n]o
Nebraska case recognizes a right to privacy, based on our Constitution,
broader than the narrow federal constitutional right,” the court did not
preclude such a possibility.155 The court also cited to Roe’s holding
uncritically in In re Petition of Anonymous 1.156
Ohio: The controlling state standard in Ohio was set by its intermediate
appellate court, the Court of Appeals, in its opinion in Preterm Cleveland v.
Voinovich.157 The court “[found] no reason . . . to find that the Ohio
Constitution confers upon a pregnant woman a greater right to choose
whether to have an abortion or bear the child than is conferred by the United
States Constitution, as explained in the plurality opinion of [Casey].”158
Ohio courts will need to decide whether to maintain this interpretation of its
constitution or to pull back from Casey’s standard in lockstep with the U.S.
Supreme Court.
South Dakota: The South Dakota Supreme Court has not stated
conclusively whether a right to an abortion exists in its state constitution.
However, the following statement from a case interpreting the right to an
abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment decided shortly before Roe makes
the right’s existence under the South Dakota Constitution unlikely:
149. Gretchen Whitmer, Opinion, I’m a Pro-Choice Governor, and I’m Not Going to Sit
on My Hands Waiting for Congress, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/09/opinion/taking-the-fight-for-safe-legal-abortion-tothe-states.html [https://perma.cc/K224-M69B].
150. 185 S.W.3d 685 (Mo. 2006).
151. See id. at 691–92 (interpreting MO. CONST. art. I, § 2).
152. Id. at 692.
153. 488 N.W.2d 533 (Neb. 1992).
154. Id. at 538–39 (collecting U.S. Supreme Court cases).
155. Id.
156. 558 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Neb. 1997).
157. 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
158. Id. at 584.
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[T]he question resolves itself into whether or not the state has a legitimate
interest to legislate for the purpose of affording an embryonic or fetal
organism an opportunity to survive. We think it has and on balance it is
superior to the claimed right of a pregnant woman or anyone else to destroy
the fetus except when necessary to preserve her own life.159

Wisconsin: Wisconsin courts have not taken a clear position. It is worth
noting that the first sentence of the Wisconsin Constitution borrows language
from the opening of the Declaration of Independence,160 and the Kansas
Supreme Court found those words to recognize a fundamental right to an
abortion.161
ii. Northeast
Connecticut: A trial court opinion from the Connecticut Superior Court is
the clearest statement of the state courts’ position on abortion as of this
Essay’s publication. In Doe v. Maher,162 the court found a fundamental right
to an abortion163 in the state’s due process clause,164 equal protection
clause,165 and equal rights amendment.166 The opinion requires that
restrictions upon the right to an abortion survive strict scrutiny.167 The
Connecticut Supreme Court has not explicitly approved of this trial court
opinion, but it has favorably cited to Maher for broader propositions.168
Maine: The Maine Supreme Court has no clear position on abortion rights.
Because the court interprets the state’s due process clause169 to be
coextensive with its federal counterpart, due process claims are analyzed
under both constitutions concurrently.170 The state legislature codified that
it is the public policy of the state to protect a woman’s right to an abortion
prior to viability,171 and Maine’s Senator Susan Collins drafted a bill to
159. State v. Munson, 201 N.W.2d 123, 126 (S.D. 1972), vacated sub nom., Munson v.
South Dakota, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
160. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure
these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”).
161. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2019); supra notes
44–50.
162. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
163. Id. at 135.
164. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
165. Id. § 1.
166. Id. § 20.
167. See Maher, 515 A.2d at 157.
168. See, e.g., Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 105 (Conn.
1994) (citing Maher for its analysis of the “varying levels of judicial review . . . used
depending on the nature of the right [that a] statute or regulation impinges upon”).
169. ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A.
170. See Green v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 750 A.2d 1265, 1270
n.2 (Me. 2000).
171. See ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1598(1) (2022) (“It is the public policy of the State that the
State not restrict a woman’s exercise of her private decision to terminate a pregnancy before
viability . . . . After viability an abortion may be performed only when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.”).
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maintain Roe and Casey as the law of the land,172 so the sentiment in Maine
seems to favor breaking from the federal law if Roe and Casey are
overturned.
New Hampshire: Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court regularly
uses the primacy approach when litigants put forth concurrent state and
federal claims,173 it has restricted its abortion jurisprudence to only analysis
of federal law.174 A pre-Roe case, State v. Millette,175 discussed how
abortion bans served a much clearer purpose in the nineteenth century—
when “they had a solid basis in the inherent danger of abortions at that
time”—but by 1972, bans served less of a purpose because scientific
advancements like antibiotics, blood banks, and general medical progress
made abortions much safer.176 With a half-century of medical progress now
added to the Millette court’s understanding, that consideration may be
important in future cases.
Pennsylvania: In 1984, the Commonwealth Court—one of Pennsylvania’s
two intermediate appellate courts—made a Casey-like determination that
“[a] woman is protected from unduly burdensome interference with her
freedom to terminate a pregnancy” under the Pennsylvania Constitution.177
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court narrowed the ruling on appeal,
not reaching the issue of whether a right to an abortion exists and clearly
stating, “[t]his case does not concern the right to an abortion.”178 The court
has issued no clear statement since, but it did refer to the “right to procreate”
as a “fundamental” right that can only be limited by laws withstanding strict
scrutiny.179
iii. South
Delaware: The Delaware Supreme Court has not analyzed abortion rights
under the Delaware Constitution. Delaware’s courts do not interpret the
Delaware Constitution’s due process clause as being identical to its federal
counterpart,180 so there is little available guidance as to how the state courts
will rule in future abortion decisions.
Georgia: The Georgia Supreme Court has never determined whether the
Georgia Constitution recognizes a right to an abortion. In the 2017 case
172. See Reproductive Choice Act, S.3713, 117th Cong. (2022).
173. See State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 41 (N.H. 2013) (“Where the defendant claims a
violation of both the State and Federal Constitutions, we first address his claims under the
State Constitution, and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis.”).
174. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 346 (N.H. 1986) (“[W]e believe that Roe is
controlling; we do not hold that our decision would be the same in its absence.”).
175. 299 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1972).
176. See id. at 154.
177. Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 482 A.2d 1148, 1155 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), aff’d
in part, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
178. Fischer, 502 A.2d at 116.
179. Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. 2003).
180. Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d 1203, 1208 (Del. 2013) (“[T]he textual differences between
the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution have led to different
interpretations of their respective due process provisions.”).
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Lathrop v. Deal,181 plaintiffs sought relief based exclusively on the right to
an abortion under the Georgia Constitution, but the court did not conclude
whether such a right exists. The court recognized that the U.S. Constitution
established the “freedom of a woman to choose to abort her pregnancy,” but
it proceeded by writing, “this Court never has held that the state constitution
imposes similar limits upon the regulation of abortions.”182 The court
assumed that the right exists independently in the Georgia Constitution for
the sake of its analysis,183 but ultimately found that it could not entertain the
lawsuit against the state due to sovereign immunity.184
Kentucky: The Kentucky Supreme Court has a long, robust tradition of
libertarianism, relying heavily on the philosophy of John Stuart Mill to guide
its privacy jurisprudence.185 In Commonwealth v. Smith,186 the court made
the sweeping statement: “The power of a state to regulate and control the
conduct of a private individual is confined to those cases where his conduct
injuriously affects others. With his faults . . . which do not operate to the
detriment of others, the state as such has no concern.”187 In Commonwealth
v. Campbell,188 the court quoted from Mill’s On Liberty extensively,
including that “[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign,” and “[t]he only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.”189 Such a fervent
emphasis on protecting the autonomy of individuals may incline the court to
find a right to make the deeply personal decision of whether to get an abortion
free from government interference, unless the court finds a fetus to be
considered a separate individual.
Maryland: The Court of Appeals of Maryland—the state’s highest
appellate court—has been silent on the question of abortion rights in the
Maryland Constitution. The state’s intermediate appellate court—the Court
of Special Appeals—recognized that there is a fundamental right to an
abortion under the U.S. Constitution and further suggested that Article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights190 establishes a parallel right,191 but little
can be drawn from that. Maryland’s courts interpret their state constitutional
due process right as so similar to its federal counterpart that “the decisions of
the [U.S.] Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically
direct authorities[.]”192 However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
181. 801 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 2017).
182. See id. at 870 n.6.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 892.
185. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 496–97 (Ky. 1992) (describing the
Court’s libertarian history).
186. 173 S.W. 340 (Ky. 1915).
187. Id. at 343.
188. 117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
189. Id. at 386.
190. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24.
191. See Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 763 A.2d 209, 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
192. Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 321 A.2d 748, 755 (Md. 1974).
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interpreted Article 24 as creating a broader due process right than the
Fourteenth Amendment in limited circumstances where “fundamental
fairness” required it.193
North Carolina: The North Carolina Supreme Court has treated abortion
exclusively as a question of federal law, never interpreting its state
constitution for this purpose.194 A dissenting justice, however, has suggested
that the state constitution’s equal protection clause195 recognizes and protects
a right to an abortion independent of the U.S. Constitution.196 An
intermediate appellate court has also found that a fetus is not a “person” under
the North Carolina Constitution.197
Oklahoma: The Oklahoma Supreme Court considers abortion an “issue[]
of federal law,” and “[b]ecause the United States Supreme Court has spoken,
[the Oklahoma Supreme] Court is not free to impose its own view of the law
as it pertains to the competing interests involved.”198 The court has never
concluded whether the Oklahoma Constitution establishes the right to an
abortion,199 but it is unlikely to depart from its approach of interpreting the
Oklahoma Constitution in lockstep with the U.S. Constitution.200
South Carolina: The South Carolina Supreme Court has never taken a
position on whether the South Carolina Constitution recognizes the right to
an abortion. The state’s case law provides little guidance as to how the court
would rule on the issue. In one instance, the court expressed that granting
legal rights to fetuses would lead to absurd results, such as the estate of a
fetus being able to sue its mother under tort law if the mother received an
abortion.201
Texas: Before Roe, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest
appellate court in the state for criminal cases—found that the state
government had a “compelling interest to protect fetal life.”202 At that time,
the court had not determined whether “any pregnant woman seeking an
abortion operates within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.”203
However, the Supreme Court of Texas—the state’s highest court for civil
appeals—cited to Roe when it recognized for the first time that a right to

193. Washington v. State, 148 A.3d 341, 354 (Md. 2016) (collecting cases).
194. See Rosie J. v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 491 S.E.2d 535, 536 (N.C. 1997).
195. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
196. See Rosie J., 491 S.E.2d at 538 (Parker, J., dissenting).
197. Stam v. State, 267 S.E.2d 335, 340 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 275
S.E.2d 439 (N.C. 1981).
198. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Just. v. Cline, 441 P.3d 1145, 1151 (Okla. 2019).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1153 (“Due process protections encompassed within the Okla. Const. art. 2,
§ 7 are generally coextensive with those of its federal counterpart.”).
201. See Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 532 S.E.2d 856, 857 (S.C. 2000) (holding that
a mother negligently injured by the same act that results in the stillbirth of her fetus may seek
recovery for her own injuries, but that she may not seek damages separately for damages to
the fetus).
202. Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), vacated, 410 U.S.
950 (1973).
203. See id.
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privacy exists implicitly under various clauses of the Texas Constitution.204
As recent abortion regulations work their way through the Texas state
courts,205 Texas’s high courts may soon have an opportunity to rule
definitively on the issue.
Virginia: The Virginia Supreme Court has relied on federal law to resolve
questions related to abortion, without analyzing whether the Virginia
Constitution recognizes an analogous right.206 There is little indication of
how the court will rule on the issue in the future.
iv. West
Arizona: The Arizona Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on
whether a right to abortion exists in the Arizona Constitution. In Simat Corp.
v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System,207 the court struck down
an abortion funding law that would only subsidize abortions necessary to
save a woman’s life, finding it unconstitutional under the state constitution’s
equal protection clause.208 The court took “the right of choice announced in
Roe” as a given in its analysis of the Arizona Constitution.209 The case did
not reach whether there was a fundamental right to an abortion in the state’s
privacy clause, but the court noted that Arizona’s equal protection clause
provides a “greater privacy right” than the U.S. Constitution.210 The court
had previously interpreted the privacy clause to mean that “[a]n individual’s
right to chart his or her own plan of medical treatment deserves as much, if
not more, constitutionally-protected privacy than does an individual’s home
or automobile.”211
Colorado: Although the Colorado Supreme Court has never ruled on the
issue, the court’s privacy and equal protection decisions suggest that it may
be amenable to finding a right to an abortion under Sections 3 and 25 of

204. See Tex. State Emps. Union v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746
S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987).
205. See Madlin Mekelburg, Texas Judge Rules Some Provisions of State’s Restrictive
Abortion Law Violate Texas Constitution, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Dec. 9, 2021),
https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/state/2021/12/09/texas-abortion-law-2021judge-ruling-roe-v-wade-supreme-court/6453616001/
[https://perma.cc/CR6T-S2VS]
(discussing how a state trial judge recently found a new law that allowed private attorneys
general to enforce abortion restrictions did not provide due process).
206. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 304 (Va. 1986) (citing Roe but no state
authority for the proposition that “[w]ithin specified limits a woman is entitled to have an
abortion if she so chooses”); Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 277 S.E.2d 194, 201 (Va. 1981)
(“In the definition of a woman’s right to abort, the watershed case is Roe v. Wade.”).
207. 56 P.3d 28 (Ariz. 2002).
208. See id. at 34 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 13).
209. Id.
210. See id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”)).
211. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987).

222

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 90

Article II of the Colorado Constitution.212 In Zavilla v. Masse,213 the court
read the word “liberty” broadly in those sections, finding it “connotes far
more than mere freedom from physical restraint; it is broad enough to protect
one from governmental interference in . . . choice in countless matters of
purely personal concern.”214 The court also noted that the Colorado Framers’
failure to include a right by name—as they did with the rights to assembly,
religion, and the like—does not mean they did not intend future Coloradans
to have that right; it merely means they did not want those rights to “be left
to the uncertainty of judicial construction of a general saving clause.”215
When the law “restricts the freedom of the individual in matters of his purely
personal concern,” the court will look for a strong government
justification.216
In Lujan v. Board of Education,217 the court included the right to an
abortion under Roe in a long list of “fundamental rights” whose exercise is
protected by the state’s equal protection provisions inherent in its due process
clause.218 It stated that those rights are the ones “which have been recognized
as having a value essential to individual liberty in our society.”219
Hawaii: Although the Hawaii Supreme Court has never clearly stated that
there is a fundamental right to an abortion under the Hawaii Constitution, it
has left little doubt that there is. The court has looked to Roe for “guidance
on the intended scope of the privacy protected by the Hawaii
Constitution.”220 The court also interprets the Hawaii Constitution’s privacy
clause221 to “afford[] much greater privacy rights than the federal right to
privacy[.]”222 The privacy clause explicitly requires that limitations on
Hawaiians’ right to privacy serve a compelling state interest,223 mirroring
Roe. Further, the court has discussed the “fundamental privacy right to
procreational autonomy” as if it were a given.224 Taken together, it seems
exceedingly likely that a fundamental right to an abortion exists under the
Hawaii Constitution.
Idaho: The Idaho Supreme Court has been silent on abortion. In the
1980s, the court recognized that “the many problems associated with
212. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3 (mirroring the Declaration of Independence’s opening
sentence: “All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which
may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . and of seeking
and obtaining their safety and happiness”); id. § 25 (“No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.”).
213. 147 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1944).
214. Id. at 827.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
218. See id. at 1015 n.7 and accompanying text.
219. Id.
220. State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Haw. 1983).
221. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6.
222. State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988).
223. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”).
224. See Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 468 (Haw. 2005).
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illegitimate teenage pregnancy” made “the prevention of illegitimate teenage
pregnancies . . . [an] important governmental objective” and that the “state
has a strong interest in furthering” that objective.225 It also observed that Roe
“established that public policy now supports, rather than militates against,
the proposition that a woman not be impermissibly denied a meaningful
opportunity to make the decision whether to have an abortion.”226
Nevada: The Nevada Supreme Court has not interpreted whether the
Nevada Constitution contains the right to an abortion, but the court has
continued to point to Roe as the source of that right under the U.S.
Constitution despite Casey restricting its breadth.227
New Mexico: In New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson,228 a
case involving the funding of abortions, the New Mexico Supreme Court
came short of finding that a fundamental right to an abortion exists but
indicated its support of the right. New Mexico ratified the Equal Rights
Amendment into its state constitution,229 and the court in New Mexico Right
to Choose/NARAL stated that the Amendment provides women with
significantly more protection from discrimination than the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution provides.230 Like the Iowa Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland,231 the New Mexico court cited
extensively to Justice Ginsberg’s writings on equal protection, and it found
that gender-based discrimination must pass strict scrutiny, despite federal
courts only applying intermediate scrutiny.232 The court concluded:
“[C]lassifications based on the unique ability of women to become pregnant
and bear children are not exempt from a searching judicial inquiry under the
Equal Rights Amendment to . . . the New Mexico Constitution.”233
Oregon: The Court of Appeals of Oregon—the state’s intermediate
appellate court—heard a case challenging state restrictions on abortion
funding and found that “the state’s interest in protecting potential human life
before viability of the fetus . . . is of a limited nature and is not sufficient to
outweigh the woman’s interest in her health.”234 The court suggested that

225. State v. LaMere, 655 P.2d 46, 50 (Idaho 1982).
226. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 318 (Idaho 1984).
227. See Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 349 (Nev. 1995) (“Those who do not wish
to undertake the many burdens associated with the birth and continued care of such a child
have the legal right, under Roe v. Wade and codified by the voters of this state, to terminate
their pregnancies.”).
228. 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998).
229. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 (“Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account
of the sex of any person.”).
230. See Right to Choose/NARAL, 975 P.2d at 851 (“This lack of a federal counterpart to
New Mexico’s Equal Rights Amendment renders the federal equal protection analysis
inapposite in this case.”).
231. 915 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 2018); see also supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
232. See Right to Choose/NARAL, 975 P.2d at 853–54.
233. Id. at 855.
234. Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 663 P.2d 1247, 1260 (Or. App.
1983), aff’d, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984).
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Oregon’s equal protection clause235 may establish “an independent right to
procreational choice” but declined to draw a conclusion on the matter.236 On
review, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the equal protection question
was “premature” based on the facts of the case and struck down the funding
restrictions on alternative, administrative law grounds.237 The Oregon
Supreme Court has not spoken on the question since.
Utah: The Utah Supreme Court has not analyzed abortion rights under the
Utah Constitution. In Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center,238 the
court applied Casey’s undue burden standard to an abortion question and
stated “[a]t this time we do not interpret the Utah Constitution to give any
further protection to plaintiffs than does the federal constitution.”239 It
remains to be seen whether the court will follow the U.S. Supreme Court
once it restricts that protection.
Wyoming: The Wyoming Supreme Court has not determined whether an
independent right to an abortion exists under the Wyoming Constitution,
treating abortion as a question purely “within the federal domain.”240 In a
case decided shortly after Roe, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated, “[t]he
regulation of abortions in this State is beyond the power of the courts and is
solely a matter for the legislature, which must, of course, give heed to the
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court[.]”241
CONCLUSION
If the U.S. Supreme Court overrules Roe and Casey, it will represent a
historic recession in which women lose protection of what had been
considered an inalienable right to choose to have an abortion. However, the
effects of this overruling will vary widely between states depending on
whether the states’ constitutions recognize and protect a woman’s right to an
abortion independent of the federal law. In states with constitutions that are
more protective of their citizens’ privacy and bodily autonomy than the U.S.
Constitution is, or afford greater due process, or more strictly require equal
protection under the law, or more strenuously protect religious expression
and resist the establishment of a state religion, the right to an abortion may
be undisturbed by the federal regression.242 State constitutions are much
easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution,243 so state-level abortion

235. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of
citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens.”).
236. Planned Parenthood Ass’n, 663 P.2d at 1256–57.
237. Planned Parenthood Ass’n, 687 P.2d at 787, 792–93.
238. 67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2002).
239. Id. at 448.
240. Wyo. Nat. Abortion Rts. Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 288 (Wyo. 1994).
241. Doe v. Burk, 513 P.2d 643, 645 (Wyo. 1973).
242. See Stern, supra note 9.
243. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and Individual Rights in the
Twenty-First Century, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2105, 2106 (2013) (“Although state constitutions vary
in the difficulty of their amendment procedures, no constitution is more difficult to amend
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protections can radically change with a single vote in any given year. This
is the volatile domain to which the fight over abortion rights is likely to shift
over the coming decades.

than the U.S. Constitution . . . . All but a handful of states permit ratification of amendments
by a bare popular majority.”).

